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Abstract: The reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) constitutes
part of the international climate agreements and contributes to the Sustainable Development Goals.
This research is motivated by the risks associated with the future CO2 price uncertainty in the context
of the offsetting of carbon emissions by regulated entities. The research asked whether it is possible
to reduce these financial risks. In this study, we consider the bilateral interaction of a REDD supplier
and a greenhouse gas (GHG)-emitting energy producer in an incomplete emission offsets market.
Within this setting, we explore an innovative financial instrument—flobsion—a flexible option with
benefit-sharing. For the quantitative assessment, we used a research method based on a two-stage
stochastic technological portfolio optimization model established in earlier studies. First, we obtain
an important result that the availability of REDD offsets does not increase the optimal emissions of
the electricity producer under any future CO2 price realization. Moreover, addressing concerns about
a possible “crowding–out” effect of REDD-based offsets, we demonstrate that the emissions and
offsetting cost will decrease and increase, respectively. Second, we demonstrate the flexibility of the
proposed instrument by analyzing flobsion contracts with respect to the benefit-sharing ratio and
strike price within the risk-adjusted supply and demand framework. Finally, we perform a sensitivity
analysis with respect to CO2 price distributions and the opportunity costs of the forest owner
supplying REDD offsets. Our results show that flobsion’s flexibility has advantages compared to a
standard option, which can help GHG-emitting energy producers with managing their compliance
risks, while at the same time facilitating the development of REDD programs. In this study we limited
our analysis to the case of the same CO2 price distributions foreseen by both parties; the flobsion
pricing under asymmetric information could be considered in the future.
Keywords: optimal energy mix; CO2 emissions; REDD offsets; risk-adjusted utility
1. Introduction
The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement encourages implementation and support of activities related
to the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) [1], a climate change
mitigation strategy based on the idea to reward countries for reducing their deforestation and forest
degradation through financial benefits generated by carbon credits. However, the implementation
of REDD+ is a complex international problem [2–4] despite it is considered as a relatively low-cost
mitigation option [5,6], and its integration into the global mitigation strategy has the potential for
larger emissions reductions to be made [7]. This integration can be done by linking REDD as an
emission reduction credit program to major cap-and-trade programs [8]. In this context, credits that
could be supplied by REDD projects are an attractive mitigation option; a range of literature is devoted
to that topic, for example, References [9–11].
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REDD principles, as part of the SDG 15 are contributing directly to the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDG) [12]. However, there is an ongoing discussion related to uncertainties and risks in
REDD implementation [13–15]. A substantial problem for a potential REDD investor is the missing
legal background [16], which may mean that the future acceptance of emission credits generated by
REDD projects (to be funded today) is not guaranteed. This uncertainty regarding acceptance and
related conditions creates unacceptable risks for those potentially interested in funding/investing in
REDD projects (e.g., energy companies in potential need for offsetting their emissions). To overcome
this problem, establishment of the intermediaries such as the REDD Acceleration Fund [17] was
recently suggested, along with approaches based on optionality in purchasing REDD-based offsets [10].
There are promising pioneering steps being made in California, heading towards a law on REDD
acceptance for compliance purposes. The state of California has a placeholder in the suggested
California Tropical Forest Standard allowing international credits of up to 2% of an entity’s annual
compliance obligation; however, it has not yet issued a detailed standard or introduced regulations to
operationalize REDD application [18].
Accepting existing uncertainties, we explore bilateral interaction between a REDD supplier and
a greenhouse gas (GHG)-emitting energy producer in the context of an incomplete REDD offsets
market. We develop the FI-REDD model established in a series of publications [19,20]. FI-REDD is a
two-stage stochastic technological portfolio optimization model describing an interaction between the
REDD-offsets supplier, electricity producer and consumers. In this study, in order to contract REDD
offsets in the model, we employ a novel financial instrument—a flexible option with a benefit-sharing
mechanism called “flobsion” [21]. This instrument is different from the REDD offset contracts modeled
in previous studies. In essence, a flobsion complements an option with a benefit-sharing mechanism.
While the general idea of benefit-sharing is important within the REDD context [22], in our approach
benefit-sharing stands for possible sharing of the profits stemming from flobsions. The FI-REDD
model with exponential utility functions [23] allows the risk-averse behavior to be combined with
benefit-sharing so that their impact on contracted amounts of flobsions can be analyzed.
Another modification consists of expanding the FI-REDD model by introducing the opportunity
costs of the forest owner. Opportunity cost is the economic benefit forgone from the alternative
land/forest use [31]. It sets a minimum amount to be paid to keep the land in forest. Thus, opportunity
cost forms the basis for economic analyses of REDD [24]. In our model, the REDD supplier takes into
account the opportunity cost curve, when making the decision about supplying REDD offsets.
The key driver of this research is the high uncertainty in future CO2 prices and associated risks
in the context of REDD offsetting. The research question is about the possible reduction of these
risks using flobsion [21] and comparison of flobsion with the standard option in the REDD context.
The elaboration of this instrument is an important step in the field of modeling financial instruments
supporting REDD programs [6,10].
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we analytically investigate the construction of
flobsion in FI-REDD model. This allows the important result to be demonstrated, namely, that energy
producers would not increase their emissions if they had acquired flobsions. Second, we present
modeling results and sensitivity analysis with respect to CO2 price distributions and opportunity costs.
Finally, we discuss analytical and numerical results, as well as policy implications and possible future
research directions.
2. Methodology
In this paper we further develop the FI-REDD model established in our previous work [19,20].
The model takes into account the potential market power of energy producers, which gives them
flexibility in their decision-making under uncertain emission costs. The scheme of the model is
shown in Figure 1. The model deals with optimization of the technological mix under market power,
related to optimal scheduling of power systems [25] and market pricing in the power industry [26].
We propose an idea for setting a fair price of the REDD offsets, based on the indifference principle in
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two-stage problem setting. Utility-indifference pricing is a well-established approach to the valuation
of derivative securities in incomplete markets [27]. The indifference price is defined as the price of the
derivative toward which the investor is indifferent whether to use the derivative to maximize their
expected utility or not to use it [28]. We use fair prices to evaluate REDD offsets [19] under future CO2
price uncertainty. In the first stage (period), where details about the future REDD offsets market are
uncertain, the parties (supplier and consumer of REDD offsets) assign their offset prices (buying and
selling) in such a way that their profits or, generally, their utilities, stay the same in the second period
(in which the REDD offsets price is revealed) no matter whether they have contracted REDD offsets in
the first period or not.
FI-REDD model
Model inputs
- Installed capacity
- Fixed and variable costs
Decision variables
- Electricity supply 
covering hourly demand 
proﬁle
- Technological por�olio 
op�miza�on
- Emission oﬀse�ng
Exogenous
- Elas�city of demand
- CO2 price uncertainty
- REDD oﬀsets
Output
- Op�mal technological por�olio
- Op�mal proﬁt/cost
- Risk proﬁles (u�li�es)
- Ra�onal oﬀse�ng
Endogenous
- Electricity demand
- Electricity price
Figure 1. Scheme of the FI-REDD model.
We implement flobsion as the REDD offset in the model. Flobsion complements the standard
option with a benefit-sharing mechanism. Methodologically, the idea is close to revenue-sharing
contracts in supply chain coordination, under which a supplier receives a percentage of revenue
generated by retailer [29]. Here we specifically consider a situation where benefits are shared between
the REDD supplier and consumer. Therefore, we prefer the term “benefit-sharing” to distinguish our
study from “revenue-sharing” in supply chain coordination, for example, Reference [30].
In this study we also advance the decision-making of the forest owner by implementing an
opportunity costs curve in the model. Opportunity costs are foregone economic benefits from
forest-uses, which are alternative to REDD. These include social-cultural costs and indirect costs [31].
In this study we use non-linearly increasing opportunity cost with respect to the amount of offsets
supplied. We also perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the opportunity costs.
In summary, our methodology combines the following approaches:
1. Two-period technological portfolio optimization
2. Exponential risk-preferences
3. Utility-indifference pricing
4. Optionality of purchasing emission offsets
5. Benefit-sharing mechanism
In this section we provide the theoretical framework accompanied by some analytical results.
In particular, we derive formulas for indifference prices, which form the basis of our analysis. These will
allow us to construct the risk-adjusted fair prices of a seller and a buyer of REDD flobsions for all
admissible benefit-sharing ratios and strike prices. The prices will, in turn, help in identifying the
amounts and prices of contracted flobsions.
2.1. Decision-Making of the Electricity Producer
We consider two optimization problems of the electricity producer in the “second” period, which
is when REDD offsets are traded on a market (as opposed to the “first” period when there is no such
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market). The first optimization problem is decision-making under the realized CO2 price without
REDD offsets, that is, flobsions in this study. The electricity producer can modify its technological
mix to reduce emissions or raise the electricity price, thus making the consumer bear some of the
costs [19]. The second problem is complemented by REDD-offsets flobsions. The electricity producer
can use flobsions either to offset emissions or to sell on the market at the CO2 price. In the latter
case, the income from selling REDD offsets should be shared with the forest owner. The use of the
flobsion also depends on the level of the strike price compared to the CO2 price. Let us start with the
first problem.
2.1.1. Optimization without Flobsions
For every CO2 price realization, pC, the electricity producer chooses technological mix, x,
to maximize its profit ΠEP:
maximize
x(pC)∈X
{ΠEP(x(pC)) = Πe(x(pC))− pCE(x(pC))}, (1)
where x = x(pC)—technological mix, X—feasibility domain (all admissible technological
portfolios), pC—CO2 price realization, Πe—profit component without emission cost and E—emissions
corresponding to technological mix x. In the problem formulation: profit is the objective function,
technological mix is the control variable and emission prices are exogenous variables.
Let us denote optimal technological mix by xˆ(pC) and corresponding profit and emissions as
ΠˆEP(pC) = ΠEP(xˆ(pC)), (2)
Eˆ(pC) = E(xˆ(pC)). (3)
The solution of the problem (1) delivers an optimal response of the electricity producer in terms
of profits and emissions to CO2 prices.
2.1.2. Definition of Flobsion
A common “call” option for an asset (e.g., for an emission offset) or simply an option, implies that
a buyer pays an amount p to the seller of the option for the future possibility of purchasing the asset at
an agreed “strike” price pmin. The owner of the option decides in the future whether to make such a
purchase or not, so that for them it is a possibility but not an obligation.
A flobsion is a generalized form of option. A buyer pays the amount pδ to the seller of a flobsion
for the future possibility of purchasing the asset at the agreed “strike” price pmin plus the discounted
difference between the asset’s market price pC and pmin, if that difference is positive (or just pmin
otherwise). If the flobsion holder decides to purchase an asset within the period of validity of a flobsion,
they would pay the amount:
aδ =
{
pmin + (1− δ)× (pC − pmin), if pC > pmin
pC, if pC ≤ pmin , (4)
meaning that an asset is being purchased at a market price pC and the flobsion is not being executed
if pC ≤ pmin, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is a discount to the market price using pmin as a base. In the case of
a flobsion, a future asset purchase is still optional for the buyer as in the case of a standard option.
The price for the future purchase of an asset in the case of a flobsion, though not fixed, is still tied to
the market price. For δ = 1, meaning a 100% discount to the market price (retaining the strike price),
a flobsion turns into an option.
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2.1.3. Optimization with Flobsions
Let us consider the profit of the electricity producerΠREP(x)with flobsion at a CO2 price realization
in the second period:
ΠREP(x) =

Πe(x)− pCE(x)− pEE , if pC ≤ pmin
Πe(x)−
(
pmin + (1− δ)(pC − pmin)
)E+
+pC[E − E(x)]+ − pC[E(x)− E ]+ − pEE , if pC > pmin
(5)
where E ∈ [0, Emax] is the volume of offsets covered by flobsions and contracted in the first period,
Emax—maximum amount of flobsions supplied by forest owner, δ ∈ [0, 1]—benefit-sharing ratio,
pmin—flobsion strike price, pE—the price the electricity producer pays for flobsion in the first
period, and
[Y]+ =
{
Y, if Y > 0
0, otherwise.
(6)
Equation (5) can be interpreted as follows. When the CO2 price realization is lower than the strike
price, the electricity producer does not use flobsion. In the case where the price realization exceeds
the strike price, the electricity producer pays the price pmin for flobsions to the forest owner and also
shares their profit from the price difference (between the CO2 price and the strike price) with the forest
owner. The sharing is determined by ratio δ ∈ [0, 1], such that the electricity producer gets a share
of δ and share (1− δ) goes to the forest owner. Moreover, the electricity producer has two options:
either to emit more CO2 than the amount contracted through flobsions and pay the CO2 price for the
non-offset emissions or to emit less than the amount contracted through flobsions and sell the unused
offsets on the market at respective CO2 price. Additionally the price pE is paid to the forest owner for
flobsions in the first period, that is, that is the sunk cost.
Let us expand Equation (5) for the case pC > pmin with respect to emissions in the second period.
Case 1. If E − E(x) > 0, then
ΠREP(x) = Πe(x)−
(
pmin + (1− δ)(pC − pmin)
)E + pC(E − E(x))− pEE =
Πe(x)− pCE(x) + δ(pC − pmin)E − pEE . (7)
Case 2. If E − E(x) ≤ 0, then
ΠREP(x) = Πe(x)−
(
pmin + (1− δ)(pC − pmin)
)E − pC(E(x)− E)− peE =
Πe(x)− pCE(x) + δ(pC − pmin)E − pEE . (8)
Equations (7) and (8) are the same, showing the equivalence between offsetting emissions and
selling offsets on the market for CO2 price pC. We can simplify Equation (5) as follows:
ΠREP(x) =
{
Πe(x)− pCE(x)− pEE , if pC ≤ pmin
Πe(x)− pCE(x)− pEE + δ(pC − pmin)E , if pC > pmin
(9)
Let us formulate the optimization problem with REDD flobsions in the second period.
Given the flobsion strike price pmin, benefit-sharing ratio δ ∈ [0, 1], amount of REDD offsets E
contracted in the first period at price pE, the electricity producer maximizes their profit at every CO2
price realization pC:
maximize
x(pC)∈X
{ΠREP(x(pC))}, (10)
where ΠREP(x(pC)) is defined in Equation (9). Let us denote optimal technological mix by xˆ
R(pC) and
corresponding profit by ΠˆREP(pC) = Π
R
EP(xˆ
R(pC)).
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Lemma 1. For any amount E , price pE, benefit-sharing ratio δ and strike price pmin, technological mix xˆR(pC)
solving the problem with flobsions (10) coincides with the optimal technological mix solving the problem without
flobsions (1) at every CO2 price realization, pC.
Proof. As terms pEE , δ(pC − pmin)E in Equation (9) are independent of x(pC), then they are not part of
the optimization problem with flobsions (Equation (5)) and are used only for calculating the resulting
optimal profits. Therefore, the optimal mix xˆR(pC) solving problem (9) and (10) coincides with the mix
xˆ(pC) solving problem (1).
Corollary 1. Optimal profit with REDD flobsions, ΠˆREP(pC), at every CO2 price realization is calculated
as follows:
ΠˆREP(pC) =
{
ΠˆEP(pC)− pEE , if pC ≤ pmin
ΠˆEP(pC)− pEE + δ(pC − pmin)E , if pC > pmin
(11)
Corollary 2. Optimal emissions Eˆ(pC) in the problem with REDD flobsions are the same as in the problem
without REDD flobsions:
Eˆ(pC) = E(xˆR(pC)) = E(xˆ(pC)).
Remark 1. Corollary 2 shows that the optimal emissions of the electricity producer with REDD flobsion stay
the same as in the case without REDD flobsion. This indicates that there is no risk that energy producers will
change their production and emit more as compared to the case without offsets. This is explained by the fact that
offsets can be sold at the CO2 market price and that this opportunity is the highest profit, the energy producers
can get from the offsets they possess.
2.2. Decision-Making of the Forest Owner
We consider a forest owner, who decided to allocate part of their forest to REDD+ offsets and who
assesses the value of the forest covering the offsets in amount E ∈ (0, Emax], where Emax is the maximum
available volume. There are two possibilities in the second period: the forest owner meets the CO2
price either without participating in REDD or with an obligation corresponding to flobsions sold to the
electricity producer.
Forest owner’s profit without selling flobsions in the first period is calculated as follows:
ΠFO = E ·max{pop(E), pC}, (12)
where pop = pop(E) is opportunity cost associated with forest values alternative to REDD+. If the
forest owner did not engage in contracting flobsions in the first period, they still can sell the amount in
the second period at the market CO2 price or can take advantage of other opportunities (e.g., selling
wood), whichever delivers a greater profit.
When forest owner engages in contracting flobsion in the first period, their profit at CO2 price
realization in the second period is calculated the following way:
ΠRFO(pC) =
{
E pF + E ·max{pop(E), pC}, if pC ≤ pmin
E pF +
(
pmin + (1− δ)(pC − pmin)
)E , if pC > pmin (13)
where pF is the price paid to the forest owner for flobsions in the first period by the electricity producer.
When CO2 price realization is below strike price pmin, the forest owner has the income from selling
flobsions in the first period, E pF. Moreover, as the electricity producer does not exercise flobsions in
this case, the forest owner decides whether to sell that amount of flobsions on the market by comparing
market price pC with opportunity cost. When CO2 price realization is higher than the strike price,
the first term in Equation (13), the case pC > pmin, stands for the income from selling the flobsion in
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the first period and the second term is the profit coming from the electricity producer (cf. Equation (9))
including the strike price pmin and shared benefits with parameter δ.
Let us note that we consider deterministic opportunity costs of the forest owner. This is based on
the assumption that forest value is rather stable over time as compared to the offsets price.
2.3. Indifference Prices of the Forest Owner and Electricity Producer
To calculate indifference prices, we consider discrete distribution of CO2 prices with probabilities
wi, ∑Ni=1 wi = 1, corresponding to price realizations p
i
C, i = 1, . . . , N, where N is the number of
realizations and assume the growing sequence piC > p
i−1
C . Let us consider expected utilities of the
electricity producer U(ΠˆEP) and U(ΠˆREP) without and with flobsion, respectively. Now we consider
prices pF and pE as unknowns and find them from indifference equations. The fair price of the
electricity producer is determined by the utility-indifference equation:
pE = pE(E , pmin, δ, piC, wi) :
U(ΠˆEP(piC), wi) = U(Πˆ
R
EP(E , pE, pmin, δ, piC), wi), i = 1, . . . , N,
meaning that the expected utility stays the same, no matter if the electricity producer contracts
flobsions in the first period or not. Where ΠˆEP(piC) is the solution to problem without flobsions (1)
and ΠˆREP(E , pE, pmin, δ, piC)—with flobsions (10) at i-th CO2 price realization.
Similarly, if we denote utilities of the forest owner by U(ΠˆFO) and U(ΠˆRFO), then their fair price is
determined by equity:
pF = pF(E , pop, pmin, δ, piC, wi) :
U(ΠFO(E , pop, piC), wi) = U(ΠRFO(E , pF, pmin, δ, piC), wi), i = 1, . . . , N,
where ΠFO(E , pop, piC) and ΠRFO(E , pF, pmin, δ, piC) are profits (12) and (13), respectively, at i-th CO2
price realization.
Indifference prices can be derived numerically for any distribution and utility. However, analytical
derivation is not always possible [19]. Below we consider risk-neutral and exponential utilities, which
allow for analytical derivation and modeling risk-preferences. When the indifference curves are
constructed for a range of flobsions’ amounts, we can check whether the amount can be contracted
by comparing the prices of the electricity producer and forest owner. Namely, the amount E can be
contracted if the buyer’s price is not less than the seller’s price: pE(E) ≥ pF(E).
2.3.1. Risk-Neutral Utilities
In the case of risk-neutral (r.-n.) utilities the indifference prices are calculated according to
equations (see Appendix A.1):
pr.−n.E = p
r.−n.
E (E , δ, pmin, piC, wi) = δ ·
N
∑
i=i∗+1
(piC − pmin)wi, (14)
pr.−n.F = p
r.−n.
F (E , δ, pmin, pop, piC, wi) =
N
∑
i=i∗+1
(
max{pop(E), piC} − pmin − (1− δ)(piC − pmin)
)
wi, (15)
where i∗ is the largest number when piC ≤ pmin. In this case the price of the electricity producer does
not depend on the flobsions’ amount. The price of the forest owner depends on the quantity only via
the opportunity cost pop(E).
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Lemma 2. In the risk-neutral case for δ > 0, the volume of flobsions E can be contracted if the following
inequality holds:
N
∑
i=i∗+1
max{pop(E), piC}wi ≤
N
∑
i=i∗+1
piCwi. (16)
Proof. Let us calculate the difference between pE (14) and pF (15), when δ > 0:
pr.−n.F (E)− pr.−n.E =
N
∑
i=i∗+1
(
max{pop(E), piC} − piC
)
wi.
Therefore, Equation (16) guarantees that seller’s price exceeds buyer’s price for amount E , that
is, pr.−n.E ≥ pr.−n.F (E).
Remark 2. Lemma 2 shows that in the risk neutral case, whether the amount of flobsions is contracted or not,
depends on the relationship between the opportunity costs of the forest owner and the CO2 price distribution
above the strike price pmin and it is independent of the benefit-sharing ratio δ.
2.3.2. Exponential Utilities
In the case of exponential utilities (risk preferences, r.-p.) the indifference prices are calculated
according to equations (see A.2):
pr.−p.E = p
r.−p.
E (E , α, δ, pmin, piC, wi) =
1
αE · (ln
(
N
∑
i=1
e−αΠˆEP(p
i
C)wi
)
−
ln
(
i∗
∑
i=1
e−αΠˆEP(p
i
C)wi +
N
∑
i=i∗+1
e−α(ΠˆEP(p
i
C)+δ(p
i
C−pmin)E)wi
)
), (17)
pr.−p.F = p
r.−p.
F (E , α, δ, pop, pmin, piC, wi) =
1
αE · (ln
(
i∗
∑
i=1
e−αE·max{pop(E),p
i
C}wi +
N
∑
i=i∗+1
e−αE(pmin+(1−δ)(p
i
C−pmin))wi
)
−
ln
(
N
∑
i=1
e−α·E ·max{pop(E),p
i
C}wi
)
), (18)
where α 6= 0 is the parameter of risk preferences [23]. When α→ 0 the risk-adjusted prices converge to
the risk-neutral ones.
Remark 3. When δ = 0 the price pr.−p.E (Equation (17)) equals to zero—the same as in the risk neutral
case (Equation (14)). This means that when there is no benefit-sharing (i.e., no discount to a market price),
the electricity producer is indifferent to contracting the offsets at zero price.
3. Modeling Results
In this section we present modeling results making use of the methodology described above.
We employ the FI-REDD model calibrated in previous studies. Basically, to calculate the indifference
prices, we need information only about optimal profits of the electricity producer (see Corollary 1).
In the example we take the following distribution:
piC = 10 · (i− 1), wi = 1/9, i = 1, . . . , 9, (19)
where CO2 price varies from 0 US$/tCO2 to 80 US$/tCO2 with the step 10 US$/tCO2. Here we
consider the uniform distribution, that is, each price realization has the same probability equal to 1/9.
Profits of the electricity producer at each price realization are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Annual profit of the electricity producer in the FI-REDD model with respect to growing CO2
price, adapted from Reference [19].
In our experiments we vary offsets’ amount in the range from 1 to 100 MtCO2. For the forest
owner we assume the following opportunity cost function:
pop(E) = K · (0.4 · E + 0.005 · E2), (20)
where E is measured in tons of CO2 and K is a scaling coefficient. Opportunity costs increase with the
amount of flobsions, equivalent to the forest area allocated for offsets. The more forest is allocated to
flobsion, the higher is the opportunity cost. We choose the price range consistent with the CO2 price
distribution. Below we consider the case, K = 0.9, when opportunity cost varies between 0 US$/tCO2
(for zero offsets) and 81 US$/tCO2 (for 100 MtCO2). This range is consistent with some empirical
studies (e.g., Reference [32]).
3.1. Impacts of Risk-Aversion on Contracted Amounts and Equilibrium Prices
In our experiments we compare risk-neutral case with risk-averse cases. In Figure 3 we show
risk-neutral indifference curves (dashed) lines based on Equations (14) and (15) and risk-averse (solid
curves) based on Equations (17) and (18), corresponding to coefficient α = 0.001 for the strike price
pmin = 20 US$/tCO2 and benefit-sharing ratio δ = 0.5. We also show curves for two intermediate
values of the risk-preference parameter α = 0.0001 and α = 0.0005.
In the study we use the following notations for the cases with considered risk-preferences:
• N—risk-neutral (α = 0);
• A1—risk-aversion parameter α = 0.0001;
• A2—risk-aversion parameter α = 0.0005;
• A3—risk-aversion parameter α = 0.001.
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Figure 3. Indifference prices in the FI-REDD model with flobsions. Comparison of risk-neutral
case (N) with risk-averse cases: A1, A2 and A3, for benefit-sharing parameter δ = 0.5, strike price
pmin = 20 US$/MtCO2, CO2 distribution (19) and opportunity cost (20) with K = 0.9. Blue curves
correspond to indifference prices of the electricity producer and red curves of the forest owner.
Blue curves correspond to indifference prices of the electricity producer and red curves—of the
forest owner. In the risk neutral case the price of the electricity producer is constant. The price of
the forest owner (15) stays the same until the amount of offsets 50.9 MtCO2 and increases afterwards.
Therefore, for the fixed parameter δ = 0.5 and strike price pmin = 20 US$/tCO2, the contracted amount
is 50.9 MtCO2 at the price 11.67 US$/tCO2 contracted via flobsion (and assuming an additional future
payment). For small values of parameter α (case A1) the indifference curves are close to the risk-neutral
lines. The figure shows how the risk-aversion (cases A1, A2 and A3) transforms the indifference
curves of the parties. The price of the electricity producer is a monotonically declining with respect to
amount of flobsions, while the price of the forest owner becomes rather U-shaped as demonstrated in
the figure. This shape can be explained by relatively low opportunity costs for the smaller amounts
of flobsions and, therefore, the risk-averse forest owner prefers to sell those via flobsion to have a
“guaranteed” higher income. However, when opportunity costs are high, a rational forest owner
would avoid entering into a REDD-offsetting contract. In the particular case indicated in Figure 3,
risk-aversion increases the contracted amount of flobsions, that is, the maximum amount 65.3 MtCO2
can be contracted at the intersection of solid lines (A3) at the equilibrium price 11.09 US$/tCO2.
3.2. Contracted Amounts and Equilibrium Prices with Respect to Benefit-Sharing Ratio
Let us fix the strike price as in Figure 3, pmin = 20 US$/tCO2 and calculate the contracted
amounts for all possible benefit-sharing ratios. According to Remark 3, we consider the case of zero
discount (and hence zero-purchase price) as degraded and, therefore, stick to the range of δ ∈ [0.05, 1].
Contracted amounts are shown in Figure 4a. In the risk-neutral case (dashed blue line) the contracted
amount is constant and equals 50.95 MtCO2. As the plots show risk-aversion increases the contracted
amounts for this strike price. An interesting feature is that there is a nonlinear dependence of the
contracted amount with respect to benefit-sharing ratio δ in the risk-averse case. Red curves are concave
with respect to benefit-sharing ratio, meaning that there is a maximum amount of contracted flobsions
for every risk-aversion parameter. Here for A1 the maximum contracted amount is 57.1 MtCO2, that is
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reached at the benefit-sharing ratio, δ = 0.5. For A2 the maximum amount is 64.4 MtCO2 at δ = 0.4
and for A3—65.65 MtCO2 at δ = 0.4. Note, that here we considered discrete values of δ with the
step 0.05.
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Figure 4. Contracted amounts (a) and equilibrium prices (b) of flobsion with respect to benefit-sharing
parameter δ ∈ [0.05, 1] for the fixed strike price pmin = 20 US$/tCO2, CO2 distribution (19)
and opportunity cost (20) with K = 0.9. Comparison of risk-neutral case N (blue line) with risk-averse
cases A1, A2 and A3 (red curves).
In Figure 4b we show the equilibrium prices corresponding to contracted amounts in Figure 4a.
The prices are increasing with respect to growing benefit-sharing ratio. Note, that the maximum
price is achieved when δ = 1. This case corresponds to standard option. Thus, flobsion decreases the
equilibrium price compared to option due to additional flexibility in choosing the benefit-sharing ratio.
We also find out that for lower benefit-sharing ratios the equilibrium prices in the risk-averse case (red
curves) are higher as compared to the prices in the risk-neutral case (blue line) but it is opposite for
higher benefit-sharing ratios. This can be explained by the risk-aversion of the electricity producers,
who are more comfortable with higher ratios. However, together with the price increasing at higher
ratios, the amounts of contracts decline as shown in Figure 4a.
3.3. Impacts of Strike Prices on Contracted Amounts and Equilibrium Prices
To be consistent with CO2 price distribution (19), we consider 8 strike prices varying in the range
from 0 to 70 US$/tCO2 with the step 10 US$/tCO2. In Figure 5a we show how contracted amounts
of flobsions change with respect to pmin for the fixed benefit-sharing ratio δ = 0.7. One can see that
contracted volumes increase with the growing strike price in all cases. The smallest amounts in all
cases can be contracted at zero strike price: 21.85 MtCO2 (N), 33.75 MtCO2 (A1), 46.45 MtCO2 (A2),
50.05 MtCO2 (A3).
Moreover, risk aversion increases the contracted amounts for small values of the strike price.
This can be explained by the relatively high opportunity costs of the forest owner compared to the
low strike price and at the same time by higher CO2 prices expected by the electricity producer.
This situation changes when the strike price is relatively high; for larger values of the strike price
the risk-averse amounts start to converge to risk-neutral case. At final rather extreme strike price,
pmin = 70 US$/tCO2, which is close to maximum CO2 price, the amount contracted in risk-neutral case
exceeds the amount in risk-averse cases. This can be explained by the high value of the benifit-sharing
ratio, δ = 0.7 considered in this case.
Figure 5a shows that maximum contracted amounts for δ = 0.7 take place at maximum strike
price pmin = 70 US$/tCO2: 99.25 MtCO2 (N), 96.85 MtCO2 (A1), 96.65 MtCO2 (A2), 96.45 MtCO2 (A3).
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Figure 5. Contracted amounts (a) and equilibrium prices (b) of flobsions with respect to strike price
pmin for benefit-sharing ratio δ = 0.7, CO2 distribution (19) and opportunity cost (20) with K = 0.9.
Comparison of risk-neutral case N with risk-averse cases A1, A2 and A3.
The equilibrium prices with respect to pmin are shown in Figure 5b for δ = 0.7. The case A1 is very
close to N in terms of prices. All equilibrium prices decrease with respect to growing pmin, as a higher
strike price implies less possibilities for the energy producer to “earn” on a discount as compared
to the market price. In the risk-neutral case the price varies from 0.78 to 28 US$/tCO2, while in the
risk-averse case A3—from 0.79 to 26.12 US$/tCO2.
3.4. Full Flexibility Of Flobsion
Let us now consider all combinations of benefit-sharing ratios and strike prices and their impacts
on contracted amounts of flobsions and their prices. Figure 6a shows the contracted amount with
respect to δ ∈ [0.05, 1] and pmin ∈ [0, 70] in the risk-neutral case N. We see that the surface has a
concave shape, increasing with respect to growing pmin. We also note, that the surface levels are
constant with respect to δ. However, looking at the corresponding equilibrium prices in Figure 7a we
observe an evident decrease of the prices with respect to declining δ. Thus, even in the risk-neutral
case benefit-sharing has a positive effect of decreasing the equilibrium price. Figure 7a shows that
highest prices at every pmin correspond to largest δ = 1, that is, the case of standard option.
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Figure 6. Contracted amounts of flobsions with respect to benefit-sharing ratio, δ ∈ [0.05, 1] and
strike price pmin ∈ [0, 70]: (a) risk-neutral case N, (b) risk-averse case A3. CO2 distribution (19)
and opportunity cost (20) with K = 0.9.
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Figure 7. Equilibrium prices of flobsions with respect to benefit-sharing ratio, δ ∈ [0.05, 1] and strike
price, pmin ∈ [0, 70]: (a) risk-neutral case N, (b) risk-averse case A3. CO2 distribution in Equation (19)
and opportunity cost in Equation (20), where K = 0.9.
Figure 6b shows how the risk-aversion case A3 transforms the risk-neutral surface (cf. Figure 6a).
The minimum value in case A3, 30.45 MtCO2, corresponds to δ = 0.05 and pmin = 0, while
the maximum is 99.45 MtCO2 corresponds to δ = 0.15 and pmin = 70. Both minimum and
maximum values in case A3 are larger than in case N, where the values are 21.85 MtCO2 and
99.25 MtCO2, respectively.
Equilibrium prices in case A3 are depicted in Figure 7b. Although the shape of the surface is
similar to case N (cf. Figure 7a), we observe lower prices in case A3, particularly, for lower strike
prices and higher benefit-sharing ratios.
3.5. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we perform sensitivity analysis of modeling results with respect to opportunity cost
of the forest owner and CO2 price distribution envisioned by both decision-makers. For illustration
we take the risk-averse case A3 and compare the contracted amount of flobsions to those depicted in
Figure 6b.
3.5.1. Non-Uniform CO2 Price Distributions
The analysis above was performed for the uniform distribution. However, analytical formulas
are valid for arbitrary distribution. In order to check how modeling results change with respect to
distributions, we analyze two non-uniform cases. In the first case, CO2 prices are the same as in (19)
but the probabilities are shifted to lower price realizations, meaning that decision-makers envision
smaller CO2 prices more likely to happen. We consider the following distribution:
piC = 10 · (i− 1), i = 1, . . . , 9,
w1 = 0.11, w2 = 0.22, w3 = 0.33, w4 = 0.22, w5 = 0.11, wj = 0, j = 6, . . . , 9. (21)
The mean CO2 price in this case is 20 US$/tCO2, which is half less than 40 US$/tCO2 in (19).
The contracted amounts are shown in Figure 8a. We see that they are becoming zero after the strike
price reaches the highest CO2 price with positive weight p5C = 40 US$/tCO2, as the electricity producer
would not buy any offsets. For pmin ≥ 40 the surface stays at zero level for all benefit-sharing ratios.
Before this threshold, determined by distribution (21) the surface is qualitatively similar to the one
with uniform distribution (cf. Figure 6b) but the values are lower due to lower expected values in the
right side of the distribution. The value at δ = 0.05 and pmin = 0 is 23.5 MtCO2, which is 30.45 MtCO2
in Figure 6b. The largest contracted amount, 62.95 MtCO2, is achieved when δ = 0.25 and pmin = 30,
that is the maximum feasible strike price in this case. Qualitatively the outcomes stay similar to the
case with uniform distribution.
Energies 2019, 12, 3792 14 of 20
Co
nt
ra
ct
ed
 a
m
ou
nt
 
of
 
ob
si
on
s, 
M
tC
O
2
Benet
-sharin
g ratio
Strike price, US$/tCO2a) b) Benet-s
haring
 ratio
Strike price, US$/tCO2
Co
nt
ra
ct
ed
 a
m
ou
nt
 
of
 
ob
si
on
s, 
M
tC
O
2
Figure 8. Contracted amounts of flobsions with respect to benefit-sharing ratio, δ ∈ [0.05, 1] and strike
price, pmin ∈ [0, 70]. We consider risk-averse case A3 with opportunity cost in Equation (20), where
K = 0.9 and CO2 distributions in: (a) Equation (21), (b) Equation (22).
The second alternative distribution is opposite to the previous one as it assumes more weight put
on higher CO2 price realizations. We consider the following distribution:
piC = 10 · (i− 1), i = 1, . . . , 9,
wj = 0, w5 = 0.11, w6 = 0.22, w7 = 0.33, w8 = 0.22, w9 = 0.11, j = 1, . . . , 4. (22)
The mean CO2 price in this case is 60 US$/tCO2. The results are depicted in Figure 8b.
For pmin ≤ 30, which correspond to the range of CO2 prices with zero probability in the distribution,
the surface has steady shape. For this range the contracted amounts does not change with respect
to strike price but still have concave shape with respect to δ. Note that the contracted amounts are
larger compared to the case with uniform distribution (cf. Figure 6b). This is explained by the fact that
parties put more value on flobsions in the situation of the foreseen higher CO2 prices. The minimum
value in Figure 8b is 63.95 MtCO2. For strike prices higher than pmin = 40, we see the increase in
contracted amounts. Comparing the figure to Figure 6b, we observe a sharper incline towards smaller
benefit-sharing ratios. This can be interpreted as the risk-averse electricity producer is ready to pay
higher prices in the face of high CO2 price realizations and forest owner is fine with providing a larger
discount. The maximum 99.25 MtCO2 is achieved at pmin = 70 and δ = 0.05. Let us note that this
maximum does not coincide with the one in the case of uniform distribution 99.45 MtCO2 although the
expected prices p9C = 80 and probability w9 = 1/9 coincide. This is due to the fact that a risk-averse
decision maker takes into account the entire CO2 price distribution while calculating indifference
prices as stated in Equations (17) and (18).
3.5.2. Sensitivity to Opportunity Costs
For illustration, we are not changing the shape of the opportunity cost curve but vary the scaling
parameter K in Equation (20) that was set to K = 0.9 above. We consider lower opportunity cost
curve by setting K = 0.5, meaning that the maximum cost is pop(100) = 45 US$/tCO2. The case of
lower opportunity cost curve is shown in Figure 9a for the uniform distribution. In this case flobsions
are very attractive to forest owner and they are willing to contract larger amounts compared to the
case of higher opportunity costs (cf. Figure 6b). When the strike price is high, the maximum amount
of flobsions 100 MtCO2 is contracted. This happens when pmin = 30 and pmin = 40 for a set of
benefit-sharing ratios and when pmin ≥ 50 for all δ. For pmin ≤ 30 surface conserves the concavity
properties with respect to pmin and δ. The lower opportunity costs increase the minimum contracted
amount, which constitutes 47.3 MtCO2 in this case.
In Figure 9b we show the case of higher opportunity cost curve with parameter K = 1.3 in
Equation (16), meaning that the highest cost is pop(100) = 117 US$/tCO2. In this case the shape
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of the surface is similar to the one in Figure 6b but quantitatively the contracted amounts decrease.
The minimum contracted amount is 22.55 MtCO2, while the maximum—is 78.15 MtCO2. This is due
to the fact that for each flobsions’ amount the opportunity cost curve becomes higher, while CO2 price
distribution stays the same. Here the maximum value is achieved at the highest strike price for the
range of benefit-sharing ratios δ ∈ [0.15, 0.30], indicating that at that highest strike price, the contracted
amounts start to reach some saturation level similar to Figure 9a.
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Figure 9. Contracted amounts of flobsions with respect to benefit-sharing ratio, δ ∈ [0.05, 1] and strike
price, pmin ∈ [0, 70]. We consider risk-averse case A3 with CO2 distribution (19) and opportunity cost
in Equation (20), where: (a) K = 0.5, (b) K = 1.3.
4. Discussion
In this paper the FI-REDD model was elaborated by implementing a flobsion and an opportunity
cost of the forest owner (REDD supplier). The results showed (Lemma 1) that REDD offsets provided
to the energy producer would not change the optimal emissions compared to the case of no offsets.
This delivers an important signal to policy makers. Even if the offsets are provided to the electricity
producer at no cost, it is not rational to change the technological portfolio from the optimal one
(determined solely by the carbon price) and emit more. When the market for offsets is established, it is
more profitable to sell the offsets on the market. Moreover, in the situation of higher emission costs,
the optimal emissions will decrease compared to the situation with zero emissions costs as shown in
Reference [19].
The impact of risk-preferences on the volume of contracted flobsions was analyzed. In the
risk-neutral case, the contracted amounts at every strike price are the same for both the flobsion and
the standard option. However, the price in the case of the standard option coincides with flobsion’s
price only at the largest benefit-sharing ratio, which is equal to one. For lower benefit-sharing ratios,
the equilibrium prices of the flobsion are lower compared to the standard option. They decrease
together with decreasing benefit-sharing ratio. This price decrease is more vivid for lower strike prices.
In the risk-averse case, the situation is similar in terms of prices and,moreover, the benefit-sharing
ratio allows the maximum contracted amount of flobsions to be found for every strike price.
In particular, for relatively small strike prices compared to the maximum range of CO2 prices, the choice
of benefit-sharing ratio allows for a considerable increase in the contracted amounts. That fact is of a
potential interest in the REDD context, larger contracted volumes mean more forest being allocated for
the generation of carbon offset sand that it is hence protected under the REDD umbrella. The contracted
amounts also increase when there is stronger risk-aversion.
The findings show that contracted amounts increase as the strike price grows. This is quite a
natural result, as the higher strike prices are advantageous for both parties—forest owner and electricity
producer. Thereafter, the equilibrium prices also decrease with growing strike prices. The full set of
benefit-sharing ratios and strike prices and how they impact the contracted amount and the equilibrium
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prices is illustrated in Figures 6 and 7. Interestingly, the risk-averse case shows that at every strike
price, there are values of the benefit-sharing ratio that deliver the maximum of contracted amounts.
As the research was based on the FI-REDD model, a similar range of offset amounts and CO2
prices was used. The opportunity cost curve was chosen to be consistent with these data for illustrative
purposes. Nevertheless, to check how the results react to a different setup a sensitivity analysis was
performed. The analysis shows that qualitative features remain valid. The contracted amounts are
higher when higher CO2 prices are more likely and lower when lower CO2 prices are more likely,
in both cases compared to uniform distribution. We also show that lower opportunity costs facilitate
the contracting of more offsets, while higher ones decrease the contracted amounts. The results of the
sensitivity analysis did not provide any irregularities, as the situation of symmetric information of a
buyer and a seller with respect to future CO2 price distribution was considered.
5. Conclusions
While the flobsion construct apparently has more universal applications, we see how good its fit
is in the REDD-offsetting context. This is because it supports the provision of up-front financing for the
development of offset-generating projects, while at the same time providing enough flexibility for a
balance of interest to be found between the offsets buyer and seller in the face of uncertainties associated
with future terms of offsetting. The problem of the acceptance and fungibility of REDD-based offsets
with emission allowances is still open at both national and international level [33,34]. This situation
leads to necessity to alleviate corresponding risks, and flobsion might be helpful in this regard.
Despite technical details of potential policies remaining uncertain, there is progress towards
inclusion of REDD-based offsetting for compliance at a legal level (e.g., California). Although policy
changes create opportunities, at the same time they can create risks for certain market players. The
flobsion’s properties prove it to be a potential candidate to accommodate and alleviate those risks, and,
therefore, accelerate the implementation of new policies.
The numerical results on the flobsion’s properties presented in this paper cover a rich set of cases
with respect to the varied parameters—the strike price and the benefit-sharing ratio (discount)— and
therefore make this work complete for practical applications. Such instruments could be considered in
terms of providing flexibility in the future through the benefit-sharing mechanism, thereby reducing
the initial investment. However, it is important for decision-makers to clearly formulate their policies
and in particular to formalize the legal aspects of the acceptance of the flobsion (issued today) in the
future, as well as the sharing agreements. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, we would like
to draw attention to the legal aspects of community-based human rights [35] and consideration of the
needs of indigenous peoples [36], in the implementation of REDD.
Further research could be directed towards exploration of flobsion applications beyond REDD.
The asymmetric information of a buyer and seller in terms of future uncertainties would also be an
interesting analysis.
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Appendix A. Derivation of Indifference Prices for Flobsions
Appendix A.1. Indifference Prices for Risk-Neutral Utilities
For the utility of the electricity producer without REDD we have:
U(ΠˆEP) =
N
∑
i=1
ΠˆEP(piC)wi =
i∗
∑
i=1
ΠˆEP(piC)wi +
N
∑
i=i∗+1
ΠˆEP(piC)wi,
where i∗ is the largest index when piC ≤ pmin.
Using Equation (11), we get the expected mean utility with REDD flobsions:
U(ΠˆREP) =
i∗
∑
i=1
(ΠˆEP(piC)− pEE)wi +
N
∑
i=i∗+1
(ΠˆEP(piC) + δ(p
i
C − pmin)E − pEE)wi =
i∗
∑
i=1
ΠˆEP(piC)wi +
N
∑
i=i∗+1
ΠˆEP(piC)wi + E ·
N
∑
i=i∗+1
δ(piC − pmin)wi − pEE .
By applying indifference principle U(ΠˆEP) = U(ΠˆREP) we get the price:
pr.−n.E = p
r.−n.
E (E , δ, pmin, piC, wi) = δ ·
N
∑
i=i∗+1
(piC − pmin)wi.
Utility of the forest owner without flobsion (12):
U(ΠFO) = E ·
N
∑
i=1
max{pop(E), piC}wi.
Using Equation (13), we can calculate utility of the forest owner with flobsion:
U(ΠRFO) =
i∗
∑
i=1
(E pF + E ·max{pop(E), piC})wi +
N
∑
i=i∗+1
(
(pmin + (1− δ)(piC − pmin))E + E pF + pop(E) · E
)
wi =
E · (pF + i∗∑
i=1
max{pop(E), piC}wi +
N
∑
i=i∗+1
(
pmin + (1− δ)(piC − pmin)
)
wi
)
.
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By applying the indifference condition U(ΠˆFO) = U(ΠˆRFO), we derive the following indifference
price of the forest owner:
pr.−n.F = p
r.−n.
F (E , δ, pmin, pop, piC, wi) =
N
∑
i=i∗+1
(
max{pop(E), piC} − pmin − (1− δ)(piC − pmin)
)
wi.
Appendix A.2. Indifference Prices for Exponential Utilities
For the electricity producer without REDD flobsions we get the following utility:
U(ΠˆEP) =
1
α
· (1−
N
∑
i=1
e−αΠˆEP(p
i
C)wi), (A1)
where α is the parameter of risk preferences. Expected utility of the electricity producer with REDD
flobsions is calculated as follows:
U(ΠˆREP) =
1
α
− 1
α
·
i∗
∑
i=1
e−α(ΠˆEP(p
i
C)−pEE))wi − (A2)
1
α
·
N
∑
i=i∗+1
e−α(ΠˆEP(p
i
C)+δ(p
i
C−pmin)E−pEE))wi =
1
α
− 1
α
· eαpEE ·
(
i∗
∑
i=1
e−αΠˆEP(p
i
C)wi +
N
∑
i=i∗+1
e−α(ΠˆEP(p
i
C)+δ(p
i
C−pmin)E)wi
)
.
Using Equations (A1) and (A2) we derive the indifference price:
pr.−p.E =
1
αE · (ln
(
N
∑
i=1
e−αΠˆEP(p
i
C)wi
)
−
ln
(
i∗
∑
i=1
e−αΠˆEP(p
i
C)wi +
N
∑
i=i∗+1
e−α(ΠˆEP(p
i
C)+δ(p
i
C−pmin)E)wi
)
).
For the forest owner without flobsion we have:
U(ΠˆFO) =
1
α
· (1−
N
∑
i=1
e−α·E ·max{pop(E),p
i
C}wi),
and with flobsion:
U(ΠˆRFO) =
1
α
− 1
α
·
i∗
∑
i=1
e−α(E pF+E·max{pop(E),p
i
C})wi −
1
α
·
N
∑
i=i∗+1
e−α((pmin+(1−δ)(p
i
C−pmin))E+E pF)wi =
1
α
− 1
α
· e−α·E pF ·
(
i∗
∑
i=1
e−αE·max{pop(E),pC}wi +
N
∑
i=i∗+1
e−αE(pmin+(1−δ)(p
i
C−pmin))wi
)
.
We get the following indifference price:
pr.−p.F =
1
αE · ln
(
∑i∗i=1 e
−αE·max{pop(E),piC}wi +∑Ni=i∗+1 e
−αE(pmin+(1−δ)(piC−pmin))wi
∑Ni=1 e
−α·E ·max{pop(E),piC}wi
)
.
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